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In the course of the centuries, the ‘reputation’ and status attributed to the humanities underwent 
different phases. One of their lowest moments can be traced during the positivist period. This 
article explored the reasons underlying the gradual re-evaluation of the scientific status and 
relevance of the humanities in the philosophy of science of the 20th century. On the basis of a 
historical analysis it was argued that on the one hand such recognition is positive because it 
abolishes an unjustified prejudice that restricted the status of ‘science’ to the natural sciences. 
On the other hand it was argued that the reasons behind such recognition might not always 
be sound and may be inspired by (and lead to) a certain relativism harbouring undesired 
consequences. In the final part of this article (dedicated to Prof. J.J. [Ponti] Venter) a brief 
‘postscript’ sketched his evaluation of the role of philosophy.
Introduction
When we start asking questions concerning the status of the humanities1, beginning with the 
positivist movement, we discover that the initial attitude was rather ‘unfriendly’. There was a high 
level of optimism towards the liberating effects of science, yet only or mainly the natural sciences 
were accredited as sciences. The humanities were not always and not completely excluded from 
the scientific realm, but somehow the feeling was that they had to become scientific. The royal way 
to accomplish this was to adopt the methods of the natural sciences. Up to the present, when we 
say ‘philosophy of science’ we often mean the philosophy of the natural sciences (as if there were 
no other sciences). This is a simple but vivid example of the persistence of the positivist legacy.
Gradually, however, the attitude towards the humanities changed. Slowly but increasingly, 
the humanities gained more ‘respectability’ and were increasingly appreciated in the works of 
Popper, Kuhn, Feyerabend, in neo-Marxism and so on.2 One could even say that the situation 
was gradually reversed since the natural sciences are in the postmodern times sometimes invited 
to adopt the methods of politics or hermeneutics. It is argued that there are not (and should not?) 
be any differences between the humanities and the natural sciences. Perhaps, in some sense, the 
natural sciences can even be regarded as part of the humanities?
The main focus of this article is to explore the reasons behind this gradual change of attitude for 
the purpose of evaluating the process in an informed way. From the author’s (reformational) 
point of view, the recognition of the scientific status of the humanities and of their indispensable 
role in scholarship is a positive move. The humanities should be regarded as sciences because they 
1.In this article I list as ‘humanities’ all the sciences that are not ‘natural’ (therefore the social and cultural sciences as well – cf. Strauss 2001). 
2.Our historical survey will stretch up to the early 1990s. This arrangement will allow us to explore a sufficiently extended period of time, in 
order to prove that the pattern of re-appreciation developed gradually but persistently. It will also allow us to include in our exploration 
the most authoritative voices in contemporary philosophy of science. To keep the historical survey within suitable limits, the most recent 
decades are not included. It should be noted however, that the re-appreciation or integration-trend continues up to the present.
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study reality through ‘points of entry’ constituted by several 
modal aspects, just like the natural sciences. However, the 
motivations behind this gradual re-appreciation of the 
humanities may not always be sound and may be inspired 
by (and lead to) a rather relativist position with dire practical 
implications. In some cases (cf. Feyerabend 1975) one has the 
impression that almost everything can be regarded as science 
(or perhaps nothing). In other cases, it does not matter much, 
because science has nothing special to offer and cannot be 
distinguished from other activities in ‘life’.
After completing a historical overview of the re-appreciation 
process I will briefly sketch a reformational evaluation and 
response and, as this article is dedicated to prof. J.J. (Ponti) 
Venter, I will also briefly outline his own understanding 
and assessment of the nature and role of one of the human 
sciences, namely philosophy. 
Brief background: Positivism and 
beyond
The positivist attitude towards the humanities is somehow 
ambivalent. On the one hand, an immense fascination with 
the natural sciences led many authors to oppose facts and 
values, physics and metaphysics, objectivity and subjectivity. 
Of course, the natural sciences were on the side of objectivity 
and of the facts, whilst the humanities were on the other 
side. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that Comte 
(1830–1842) included sociology in his list of scientific 
disciplines. Actually, sociology had a sort of ‘overarching’ 
function and it was placed ‘at the top’ of the six sciences 
(mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, 
sociology in ‘ascending’ order). It is also interesting to note 
that very ancient disciplines like law and history were not 
considered scientific by the ‘father’ of positivism. In general, 
however, positivism left the door open to the possibility 
that at least some of the humanities might acquire scientific 
status. In order to do so, unfortunately, they were required 
to adopt the method of the natural sciences. Sociology was 
already called ‘social physics’ by Comte, and was supposed 
to study social phenomena with the same impartiality and 
precision attributed to physics.
In positivist circles philosophy was treated with particular 
suspicion, it was often called ‘metaphysics’ and was part of 
the presuppositions that should be left outside the laboratory 
door. All in all, it was mainly natural science that enjoyed 
full recognition. Science was the only system following the 
path of verification and ‘non-scientific’ became a synonym of 
meaningless.
The humanities, however, were already knocking at the door 
of academic recognition. Dilthey (1989), Rickert (1896–1902) 
and Weber (1949) tried to attach either a different method 
or a different object of study to the human sciences. Dilthey 
(1989:56ff, 436–440) argued that the method of the natural 
sciences is totally inadequate to study history or social and 
cultural achievements. History is the product of human 
beings and is as such not reducible to natural objects. As 
a consequence, a totally different method is required: the 
imaginative re-creation of the experiences of others.
Although rejecting the ontological dualism underlying 
Dilthey’s views, Rickert (1896–1902) accepted and explored 
further the idea of an alternative method suitable to the 
humanities. The nomothetic method is suitable for the natural 
sciences, but the ideographic method suits the humanities. 
The first method focuses on the universal whilst the second 
focuses on the individual and unique. The distinction is not 
based on ontology but on logic, as the same reality can be 
regarded as nature or as history. Finally, Weber (1949:50ff) 
argued that this difference in method does not decrease 
the objectivity of the social sciences; it rather integrates an 
otherwise unilateral understanding of the world. 
Opening a back-door to the 
humanities
Although their approaches differ, all these German authors 
created an alternative to positivism and opened a door (at 
least a back-door) to the humanities. Popper walked some 
extra miles for the humanities’ sake. In opposition to the 
positivist mentality he (Popper 1963:38) stated that ‘non-
scientific’ is not equivalent to non-sensical or meaningless. 
There is meaning and knowledge outside of science. At the 
same time, however, science remains for Popper a ‘superior’ 
type of knowledge, so to speak, and by ‘science’ he basically 
means natural science (physics in particular).
In a recent article (Coletto 2011), Popper’s views on the topic 
were outlined by saying that science is present wherever we 
have universal laws. The scientific attitude requires first of 
all conjectures and refutations, in other words the possibility 
of falsification. In addition, however, science is present only 
when dealing with universal laws, which Popper detects 
especially in the physical dimension. According to Popper 
we do not have universal laws in the historical or social 
dimension (one could say: aspect), therefore we cannot 
have fully-fledged science. This is the reason why, it was 
argued (Coletto 2011:68), Popper could regard psychology 
and sociology as ‘spurious sciences’ that are ‘riddled with 
fashions and with uncontrolled dogmas’. He could therefore 
write to Kuhn: ‘[I hope] you do not want to appeal to the 
sociological (or psychological or historical) lunatic fringe’ 
(Popper 1970:57–58).
All this is true, but in some instances Popper attenuated 
and nuanced this rather harsh position, still much indebted 
to positivism. Perhaps these nuances originate in part from 
the fact that they appear in a context of dialogue with neo-
Marxism, in a volume edited by Adorno (cf. Popper 1976). 
One could also notice that they were written a few years 
later (1976) than the above quoted texts of 1963 and 1970 and 
probably further reflection had played its part.
Whatever the reason, the picture seems to change. In ‘The 
logic of the social sciences’ (Popper 1976) there seems to be 
little difference between the natural and the social sciences. 
Apparently the latter use exactly the same method as the 
former: conjectures and refutations. By means of communal 
criticism they both falsify their theories and retain the most 
corroborated ones. Objectivity is not excluded in the social 
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sciences because it depends on the critical method, not 
on the field of study. The research process starts with a 
problem and observation follows, exactly as is the case of 
the natural sciences (Popper 1976:87–90). Positivism, says 
Popper (1976:90ff), wanted the social sciences to adopt the 
same method of the natural sciences, namely the inductive 
method. But that was the wrong solution. (As a matter of fact, 
Popper too wants the same method to be adopted by both 
types of sciences; the only difference is that he regards the 
deductive approach as the right method.)
When considering the different approaches Popper adopted 
on this issue, one can find a sort of ambivalence and, 
after all, it should not be too surprising. In fact, Popper’s 
philosophy constitutes a ‘bridge’ between positivism and the 
new philosophy of science. This ambivalence was already 
noticed by Botha (1986) in relation to Popper’s appreciation 
of philosophy: On the one hand Popper warns against the 
‘bewitching’ effects of ‘metaphysics’, on the other he makes 
clear philosophical choices and defends them (Botha 1986), 
for example by endorsing realism and the existence of 
natural laws.
Opening the front door to the 
humanities?
Kuhn is the main representative of the ‘historical school’ 
of philosophy of science. This school operated a strong 
rehabilitation of the role of history in philosophy of science. 
Kuhn also realised that psychological and social factors play 
a large role in science (economic factors were mentioned less 
often). These factors may still be ‘external’ to science (Kuhn 
1996:ix–x), but one cannot understand science without 
understanding them, and for that reason the humanities 
become important.
In Kuhn’s case the front door is only half-opened, because 
his system requires that we have science only in the presence 
of a paradigm accepted by all the ‘schools’ in a certain 
discipline, at least for a certain period of undisputed reign. 
Now, if it is rare to see this situation in the humanities they 
cannot be fully scientific; they must still be caught in the pre-
paradigm phase, preceding ‘normal’ or ‘mature’ science. It 
is not excluded that they might one day reach a common 
paradigm (and maturity, or normality with it) but at least 
for the moment Kuhn still calls them ‘proto-sciences’ (Kuhn 
1970:244ff), ‘fields’, or ‘activities’ (Kuhn 1996:195; 208–210). 
Nevertheless, one might say that even though the scientific 
status of the humanities was not fully recognised by Kuhn, 
their usefulness was largely appreciated. Furthermore, Kuhn 
(ibid:138) pointed out that students of the natural sciences 
are disadvantaged with respect to their colleagues in the 
humanities, in the sense that the latter are in fact more aware 
of different approaches (paradigms) in their disciplines and 
more knowledgeable of the history of their disciplines. 
It is probably Lakatos who opened the front door with 
conviction. In order to see it, one should briefly follow his 
view of the criterion for demarcation (between science and 
non-science). Even though he was a ‘disciple’ of Popper, 
Lakatos did not agree that falsification is the best criterion 
to distinguish science from pseudo-science. Instead, Lakatos 
first of all enlarges the picture: the units of great scientific 
developments are not single theories but research programmes. 
Usually theories are only the ‘hard core’ of such programmes 
and they are surrounded by a host of protective hypotheses 
that can always justify anomalies or partial refutations of the 
hard core (Lakatos 1978:110). 
The main difference between research programmes is that 
some of them are progressing and others are degenerating. 
Degenerating programmes are those that ‘lag behind the 
facts’: they are trying to explain what is already known. 
Marxist historiography, for example, ‘explained’ the rising 
living standards of the working class in capitalist countries, 
and the conflict between China and the Soviet Union. It 
explained why the first socialist revolution occurred in non-
industrialised Russia, and it explained Berlin 1954, Budapest 
1956, Prague 1958 (Lakatos 1978:6). But all these explanations 
were constructed after the events to ‘protect Marxian theory 
from the facts’. This is an example of a stagnating research 
programme. Progressive programmes, by contrast, are rich in 
predictions and in this way they anticipate the facts. Therefore 
progressive programmes are regarded as scientific, whilst 
regressive programmes are not.
Whether this criterion is useful or not to distinguish science 
from pseudo-science is not our main concern here (one 
might in fact argue that it evades the demarcation problem). 
What is interesting for our present topic is that Lakatos 
does not exclude the humanities from his argumentation. 
Should Marxian theory have made successful predictions, 
it could have been regarded as progressive and scientific. 
The dividing line between science and non-science does not 
run across disciplinary boundaries (e.g. natural versus social 
sciences) but across research programmes. This changed the 
discussion deeply and was of course appreciated by scholars 
in the humanities. Appreciated and often appropriated. For 
example, Nancey Murphy (1990), in her attempt to prove 
that theology is a science, adopted Lakatos’ criteria and felt 
entitled to conclude that (at least some) theological research 
programmes can be considered scientific.
In the front door and out the back 
door?
When it comes to Feyerabend we have the feeling that he 
has no problem with recognising the scientific status of 
the humanities. In his Against method (Feyerabend 1975) he 
shows appreciation and knowledge of the history of art, 
knowledge of philosophy, theology (even Christology), and 
other disciplines. Collectively they enable him to conduct a 
discourse on science and help him arguing about science. It 
is true that here and there he delivers a few harsh remarks on 
theology and philosophy (cf. Feyerabend 1975:46, 301), but 
this is due to his provocative style3 rather than to any real 
opposition to the humanities.
3.In his typical style Feyerabend (1975:301) ‘classifies’ philosophy (of science) amongst 
the ‘bastard subjects … which have not a single discovery to their credit’.
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The problem is rather that with Feyerabend (1975) both 
natural and human sciences lose much of their ‘value’. 
He is not fascinated by rationality but by life, passion and 
freedom. He is against the separation of science and life, in 
the sense that science should return to be part of life and 
should resemble ordinary activities as much as possible. 
There is nothing special about science and natural science is 
constantly compared and associated with the humanities, 
but also with all sorts of pre-scientific ideas and activities, 
myths, beliefs and so on. It was this type of attitude that was 
extremely frustrating to Popper and prompted some of his 
most amusing remarks (like the complaint: ‘To some, science 
is nothing but glorified plumbing!’ [Popper 1963:102]). 
Feyerabend’s anarchism, however, was probably not likely to 
be adopted by large sectors of the philosophical community. 
More convincing voices, more ‘solid’ ideologies had to enter 
the scene, in order to consolidate the ‘reputation’ of the 
humanities. Amongst them was neo-Marxism.
Habermas and human interest
Although Popper (1963:102) was quite frustrated by those who 
regarded science as ‘gadget making’, was he not the one who 
introduced interest as a key-element in science? Science starts 
with a problem, he argued. We are not merely interested in 
truth; we want interesting truth (Popper ibid:229). Now, only 
human beings have interests and problems. The emphasis on 
these themes is therefore an emphasis on the (human) subject 
of knowledge or research. Feyerabend (1975) built his own 
approach on this foundation. From a less radical perspective, 
Habermas wrote Knowledge and human interests in 1971.
For Habermas (1971:308–311), science can be categorised into 
three different types, each characterised by specific interests 
(see Table 1). 
Of the three categories, the emancipatory interest is the most 
important, since it is supposed to direct our understanding 
of the two other interests. As a consequence, the sciences 
characterised by interest acquire extraordinary importance 
and a crucial role. Habermas (1971:198) goes as far as 
affirming that all the sciences should subordinate themselves 
and their interests (e.g. technical control) to the systematic 
sciences. Accepting this priority is equivalent to adopting 
‘critical science’ as opposed to ‘traditional science’ (a 
distinction already introduced by Horkheimer). This crucial 
programme, in line with the humanist project, requires the 
return of the human agent to the centre of the scientific 
enterprise and the Humanities (or at least some of them) are 
finally placed at the top. The natural sciences, in a sense, are 
placed at the bottom.
Following Kant, Habermas (1984) regard science as one of the 
‘three spheres’ of culture, together with art and morality. In 
line with the project of the Enlightenment, the three spheres 
should be fairly distinguished from each other because 
their confusion always breeds catastrophes (for example 
the aesthetisation of politics is typical of Nazism). The three 
types of science must therefore retain a specific identity and 
are not to be confused with other types of activities, in other 
‘spheres’. This is in line with ‘the project of modernity’ that, 
according to Habermas, should not be abandoned but rather 
completed. In fact, most of the problems of Western societies, 
lamented by many, are not due to modernity itself but to the 
fact that its project ‘has not yet been fulfilled’ (Habermas 
ibid:13). 
Very soon, however, this approach was to be challenged in 
two directions: a more radical, left-oriented project (Lyotard 
1984) and a more pragmatist and ‘conservative’ project 
(Rorty 1991). Leaving apart the political dimension of this 
conversation, in the next section, we will ask what it implies 
for the status of the humanities.
Lyotard and Rorty
It is not easy, I think, to understand the role Lyotard reserves 
for the humanities in his The postmodern condition (1984). 
Perhaps this is partially due to the fact that he links his 
argumentation to the ‘three spheres’ debate. Science is one 
of the spheres and has its own ‘language game’, but what 
does it include? Lyotard seems to have in mind especially the 
natural sciences. If so, where does he place the humanities?
We surely make no mistake by saying that Lyotard in the 
end wants to reduce the contrast between the ‘sciences’ and 
‘narrative knowledge’. To him there are no big differences 
between the methods of politicians and those of scientists. 
Yet, interestingly, Rorty (1991:86) observes that Lyotard 
argues as if this was a recent change in the nature of science; 
as if the empiricist account of science was correct in the 
past, whilst now science has changed and has become 
‘postmodern’. May one speak of a strange combination 
of positivism and relativism in Lyotard? On the one hand 
Lyotard seems to agree with Hesse that ‘the logic of science is 
circular interpretation, re-interpretation and self-correction 
of data in terms of theory and theory in terms of data’ (Hesse 
1980:173). On the other hand, he seems to stick to distinctions 
and categories that are typical of empiricism. 
Nevertheless, I have difficulties imagining a ‘positivist’ Lyotard. 
I am rather inclined to think that some of his categories are 
borrowed for the sake of dialogue, in particular with those 
who may still consider science as a unique language game. In 
the end, his message is that the sciences should not be linked 
TABLE 1: Habermas’ classification of scientific disciplines.
Type of sciences Type of interest Examples
The empirical-analytical sciences Cognitive interest in technical control over objectified processes Natural sciences
The historical-hermeneutic sciences Constitutive interest in the preservation and expansion of the inter-subjectivity 
of possible action-orienting mutual understanding
History, linguistics
The systematic sciences of social action Emancipatory cognitive interest Economics, sociology, political science, philosophy
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to any meta-narrative (e.g. Habermas’ ‘emancipation’) but 
should rather be legitimised for ‘the simple fact that they do 
what they do’ (Lyotard 1984:23). If ‘language game’ is the 
common denominator of all social activities, there cannot be 
a huge difference between ‘science’ and the humanities.
Rorty (1991:87) seems to agree with this interpretation of 
Lyotard, but he still reproaches him for holding to some 
‘of the left’s silliest ideas’ and to their consequences (Rorty 
ibid:95). For example, according to Rorty (ibid:95), Lyotard has 
not sufficient consideration for (scientific) communication 
and consensus, and permanent revolution simply cannot be 
the purpose of science (Rorty ibid:85–86). But how does Rorty 
himself see the role of the humanities?
First of all, the problem of the ‘three spheres’ of Hegelian and 
Kantian memory should be abandoned: it is just a problem for 
an ‘isolated order of priests’. According to Rorty there is no 
need for universal foundations. He suggests let us leave the 
spheres of culture to do what they can do. As one may predict, 
Rorty wants to look back at Dewey and Bacon with their 
pragmatic spirit, not towards a future or virtual ‘postmodern 
science’. But surprisingly, it is Dewey himself who drives 
him towards the future, and prophetically announces the day 
when ‘science and emotion will interpenetrate, practice and 
imagination will embrace. Poetry and religious feeling will 
be the unforced flowers of life’ (Rorty 1991:95). 
After quoting this passage, Rorty (1991:95) reveals: ‘Much 
of what I have been saying is an attempt to follow up on 
this passage from Dewey’. In agreement with Dewey, the 
humanities should not be considered ‘inferior’ to the natural 
sciences. In agreement with Lyotard, Rorty states: ‘The point 
that there are no interesting epistemological differences between 
the aims and procedures of scientists and those of politicians 
is absolutely fundamental’ (Rorty ibid:92). In conclusion, we 
have reached the point where the differences between natural 
sciences and humanities can vanish without problems.
Here we can conclude our historical survey and say that 
(although the process was not always linear and ‘smooth’), 
contemporary philosophy of science gradually re-established 
the role and status of the humanities. Several strategies 
were used: initially Rickert and Weber pointed out that 
the humanities are different from the natural sciences and 
therefore should not be asked to endorse the same method 
or to treat their objects of study in the same way. Later on, 
however, the strategy changed. As soon as the humanities 
reached sufficient ‘prestige’ the idea that they are similar 
to natural science returned, but this time it was in order to 
argue that the natural sciences have nothing different from 
the humanities!
Interlude: Apart from the 
philosophers ...
Before proceeding to an evaluation of the views outlined 
above, it is necessary to remember that we have been dealing 
only with the opinions of philosophers of science. Yet they 
do not represent ‘public opinion’ or a widespread feeling in 
society. On the contrary, evaluations can be quite different 
when we hear the voices of special scientists, technicians, 
managers or the voice of the ‘person on the street’.
Generally speaking, the 20th century has known a gradual 
loss of confidence in science and technology. The optimism 
of the 18th century and 19th century, when science promised 
to lead to the truth and even to victoriously replace other 
forms of knowledge, was definitely abandoned. At the end 
of the 19th century science started to show the grim face of 
industrial exploitation, and later on the face of the nuclear 
threat, pollution and so on. A recent advertisement of a 
face cream juxtaposes a group of scientists and an attractive 
lady who uses the product. Who is one supposed to trust? 
The beautiful lady of course: she has practical knowledge 
of the product. Although some scholars are still trying to 
win scientific respectability for their discipline, we are no 
longer in the ‘age of reason’ or ‘age of science’.4 We live in 
postmodern times, and other agencies and human faculties 
are considered reliable.
Nevertheless, science is not totally depreciated, at least 
not by everybody: the utilitarian, economically driven and 
technicistic spirit of our times still has a big impact. For 
example, currently all forms of engineering are held in high 
esteem, at least in some circles, together with computer 
sciences and economics. In addition, whatever is vaguely 
perceived as ‘useful’ or ‘practical’ is highly valued, from 
medical research to military strategy. Management is highly 
rated and probably overestimated. Amongst the humanities 
I would say education and politics may retain some 
credibility, but not much more is still ‘in fashion’. Finally, at 
universities whatever can have economic relevance is highly 
appreciated. A recent report by the Academy of Science 
of South Africa (ASSAf 2011) acknowledges that in South 
Africa the humanities are weakening within the academy 
and overlooked in society (ASSAf ibid:14). The conclusion 
(fortunately), amongst some leading academic thinkers in 
South Africa is that the humanities need to be supported –
philosophy in particular (ASSAf ibid:124–131).
The ‘reputation’ of the humanities will greatly depend on the 
countries that we consult, on the periods that we take into 
account and on the circles (professional, academic, et cetera) 
expressing their opinions. This brief ‘interlude’ is just to help 
us to keep the broader picture in mind and not to exchange 
the developments of philosophy of science for public opinion.
By way of evaluation and conclusion
From a reformational point of view the gradual re-appreciation 
of the humanities is a positive phenomenon, at least partially. 
The idea that there are universal laws only in physics or 
biology is due to a reductionist ontology. It might be true that 
the natural sciences deal with laws and the humanities deal 
with norms (the latter requiring human positivisation). But 
the difference between the two is not as large as Popper seems 
4.Phrases like these recur often in the titles of articles and books by theologians who 
try to establish the scientific status of theology (cf. Barbour 1990 and Murphy 1990).
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to believe (Strauss 2001). The theory of modal aspects paves 
the way for regarding as sciences all the disciplines exploring 
reality through one (or more) modal aspect and therefore the 
re-appreciation of the humanities can be considered positive.
There is, however, some concern about the way the 
‘rehabilitation’ of the humanities was achieved. One might 
in fact wonder whether it was not reached ‘at the expense’ 
of the natural sciences. In other words one might have the 
impression that whilst the positivists emphasised the more 
basic modal aspects (physics, movement, number, et cetera), 
more recent trends emphasise aspects like the historical, 
the social, the economic and so on. It should be observed 
that the first modalities constitute the points of view of 
natural science, whilst the higher modalities ‘belong’ to the 
humanities.
Is this fascination with higher aspects the reason why 
nowadays, in some cases, the humanities seem to become 
even ‘more scientific’ than the natural sciences? Could it be 
the reason why the natural sciences are subtly invited to 
adopt the method of the humanities and even to recognise 
themselves as humanities? Are we operating a simple reversal 
of a previous hierarchy (see Habermas [1971:308–311]?) If this 
is the case, then the gradual re-evaluation of the humanities 
might be heading towards new forms of relativism (cf. 
Feyerabend 1975). In fact, the absolutisation of the historical 
or the social aspect normally places considerable emphasis 
on the subject of scientific knowledge. Science may then be 
placed within the historicist flux of paradigm-changes, with 
its revolutions leading nowhere and its scientific community 
as the supreme arbiter of truth and falsehood.
A few concrete problems are likely to affect an academic 
community in the grip of this relativistic mood, especially 
when relativism is ‘economically inspired’ (cf. Venter 
2006:288ff). Likewise Feyerabend (1975:306–308) started 
finding similarities between science and voodoo (or even 
prostitution), the temptation to legitimise subjects, courses 
and modules that are far from scientific will increasingly 
affect a university. In other words, we will deal more and 
more with what Storkey (1986) calls the ‘surrogate sciences’, 
stuff which does not belong in a university but is designed for 
purposes of economic convenience. A recent signal of malaise 
is the fact that schools and faculties try to grab for themselves 
and offer subjects which are beyond their competence for the 
(not even well disguised) purpose of increasing their student 
numbers (and financial subsidy with them).5 
The only safeguard against this relativistic drift would be the 
recognition that universal norms (conditions) are available 
both to the natural sciences and to the humanities (but of course 
not to the ‘surrogate sciences’). In other words, a demarcation 
criterion is needed which recognises the many differences 
between sciences, but at the same time affirms their common 
scientific status. This requires a non-reductionist ontological 
5.At our own Potchefstroom Campus, for example, the philosophy of the natural sciences 
or social philosophy are taught directly by the schools of physics or sociology. What 
a student can normally get, in these cases, is a survey of different ‘paradigms’ within 
those subjects, usually with insufficient deepening of the underlying philosophical 
themes. 
background, one which does not lead to the ‘veneration’ 
of one or other series of modal aspects (for example the 
ones qualifying the objects of study of the natural, social, 
or cultural sciences). For the moment, reductionism and 
absolutisations unfortunately remain strong temptations for 
several trends in philosophy and scholarship. As long as they 
coincide with uncertainty and disagreement on the criterion 
to distinguish between science and non-science, my forecast is 
that ambiguity, arbitrariness and self-interested pragmatism 
will not be easily eliminated. But of course, nothing prevents 
better choices from being adopted in future.
Postscript: Ponti Venter on the role 
of philosophy
Ponti Venter has often discussed and written on the issues 
just mentioned above (Venter 2004, 2006). Although in 
philosophical circles the gradual recognition of the humanities 
has been a well-known factor to deal with, in South Africa 
a sort of ‘positivist’ approach to many special sciences has 
survived its philosophical death. To visit the ‘orphans’6 of 
this movement, one has to descend to semi-dark laboratories 
and offices, after selecting certain subjects and certain circles 
(economics is said to be amongst the most affected). There 
one will encounter many academics who (settled in dark 
rooms, as one may imagine) proclaim their proud ignorance 
of and bitter disinterest towards all philosophy (sometimes 
including the philosophy of their own field of study). 
The irony is, of course, that they are often in the grip of a 
philosophy (or worldview?) that they don’t take the trouble 
to examine.
Unfortunately, this attitude has often created considerable 
irritation amongst reformational scholars and, in the attempt 
to show the usefulness of philosophy, they have often fallen 
into some sort of over-reaction. If one adds the problem 
that (in reformational circles) the encyclopaedic role of 
philosophy has traditionally been a bit exaggerated (Coletto 
2012a, 2012b, 2012c), one may start to understand why, in 
reaction to a dismissive attitude, in this tradition philosophy 
is sometimes depicted as the ‘gearbox’ of the vehicle (Wolters 
1989:14–15), ‘the discipline of the disciplines’ (Strauss 2009), 
a sort of almighty omni-science, and omni-present in all the 
other disciplines.
Yet there are happy exceptions. It is sufficient to read Ponti 
Venter’s (1999) ‘The role of philosophy in the reformational 
Christian university’ to notice the modest, balanced and 
appropriate picture which is drawn of the role of philosophy. 
I consider it as a sort of healthy exception, a happy manifesto 
on the humble yet meaningful task of the philosopher.
Venter explains that the ‘foundations’ of scientific theories, 
views or approaches are not the exclusive ‘property’ of 
philosophy. Philosophy, as a consequence, is ‘foundational’ 
6.In the first part of this section the tone (which is not always obvious in written 
documents) is ironical. Should my choice of the term orphans sound inappropriate 
I would like to explain that it parallels J.M. Keynes’ choice of the term slaves. With 
regard to economics he writes: ‘Practical men who believe themselves to be quite 
exempt from any intellectual influences are usually the slaves of some defunct 
economist’ (Keynes 1939:383).
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only in a certain sense (and is itself founded on a ‘worldview’). 
There is, in fact ‘more than one kind’ of foundation (Venter 
1999:198). Philosophy and foundational theory should 
therefore not be regarded as the same thing. Philosophy can 
of course help to analyse fundamental ideas, but its task is 
not to prescribe or dictate. Rather, its role is ‘that of a collegial 
critic who uncovers, unmasks, suggests and above all listens 
and cooperates’ (Venter ibid:198).
It is a recognition that avoids exaggerations and over-
reactions. It is also a return to the modest attitude attributed to 
Pythagoras7 who, after mentioning his modest knowledge of 
the ‘sciences’ of his time, explained: ‘I am only a philosopher’. 
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